Toil and Trouble?

From the new "Whole of Government" Counterinsurgency Guide

Stanton on "COIN for the Masses"

Very good article by John Stanton, in its entirety. H/t to Max Forte:

Counterinsurgency for the Masses: Educating Americans for Campaigns of National Interest

by John StantonThursday, 23 April, 2009

It is vitally important for the American public to be educated on the whys and wherefores of US counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN). President Barak Obama’s strategy for success — however one may define that — in Afghanistan/Pakistan is reliant on the belief that resurrecting COIN strategies dating back to the Vietnam Era and applying them via CENTCOM to Afghanistan/Pakistan is the recipe for success there. Add a dash of 21^st Century US technology and a measure of human terrain analysis theory to US COIN and it’ll only be a matter of time before the insurgents in the failed state of Afghanistan and the failing state of Pakistan will give in to US forces. It is Afghanistan and Pakistan that may become the New Vietnam for Americans. But it will not end there. It is a certainty that as America deploys into Africa under AFRICOM and back into Southeast Asia via PACOM that more Vietnam-like experiences will occur. There is no geographic limit on where US COIN can be applied. Success in this fascinating endeavor will extend at least 150 years into the future (two US lifetimes). Of course, that’s assuming climate change, pandemics, or the release of nuclear weapons doesn’t happen.

The release of the Bush Torture Doctrine (BTD) memos in March 2009 will prove to have been crucial to the application of US COIN. Why? Below the lofty rhetoric of COIN proponents, who invoke peace, love, soft power and understanding through human terrain analysis theory, lies the reality that US COIN is a nasty, brutish affair involving violence of the type used under the BTD, to include eliminating people and things. It is a reality that Americans refuse to accept. It is easier to believe that America does not torture but its employees and allies do. It’s easier to believe that America does not kill civilians, its UAV’s do.

To keep America at war for 150 years is an ambitious undertaking. It will require Americans to become desensitized to the type of violence US COIN requires or simply accept the proclamations of US national leadership of that the US is not an aggressor nation. Americans must support the US national interest and that means sacrificing ideals. To maintain the fat and happy American way of life demands that Americans understand, clearly, what it takes to maintain security, and keep cheap food and gas on the market. It’s often very, very ugly. The Phoenix Project Operatives and the Selous Scouts can attest to that, as can the current crop of USSOCOM operators who operate in the dark for the US national interest. Americans must become accustomed to the trickle of American dead and wounded who will return each week from the frontlines — wherever that may be — for 150 years. Showing returning US dead in flag-draped coffins helps remind Americans that US COIN means decades and decades of conflict.

A Dog in Every Fight

COIN proponents and supporters may or may not recognize that they have developed a fascinating and elegant US COIN-based national strategy that combines, under one umbrella, all long standing US National Interest Campaigns: The War on Drugs, The War on Terrorism, The War on Crime, The War on Poverty, The War in Afghanistan/Pakistan, The War in Iraq, Information Warfare, Cyber Warfare, Environmental Security, Energy Security, Food Security, etc. In this era, US National Interest Campaigns are foreign and domestic, private and public, and extend from home computers in Washington, DC to the Hindu Kush. The battlefield is everywhere and everyone is involved. The American people must be prepared to contribute (persevere?) to the ongoing National Interest Campaign. It is the national interest-infrequently ideal and mostly economic-that drives the America. The Bush Administration did not adequately prepare Americans for a constant state of war. The Obama Administration appears set on re-educating the American public for war.

National political, military, academic and multinational corporate leaders are undertaking efforts to get the American public motivated. For example, the US Government’s Counterinsurgency Guide, dated January 2009, says as much and also bears a logo that indicates this: Whole of Government, Whole of Society. The document is available through On The Homefront: Homeland Security Digital Library at http://www.hsdl.org/hslog/?q=node/4707 and www.state.gov/documents/organization/119629.pdf. The US Department of Agriculture and Transportation also contributed to the study.

“American counterinsurgency practice rests on a number of assumptions: that the decisive effort is rarely military (although security is the essential prerequisite for success); that our efforts must be directed to the creation of local and national governmental structures that will serve their populations, and, over time, replace the efforts of foreign partners; that superior knowledge, and in particular, understanding of the ‘human terrain’ is essential; and that we must have the patience to persevere in what will necessarily prove long struggles.”

Lots of Coin to Implement COIN

The US Army solicitation listed above, and quoted below, represents some of the operational requirements necessary to meet the Obama Administrations US COIN-based national security strategy (should be published in the coming months). Released in April 8, 2009 with a close date of May 8, 2009, a sole contract winner gets a guarantee of $60 Million (US) with a possibility to reach the $450 Million (US) mark. 100 personnel or more are required for this effort. Coincidentally, the close date is the same day that Don Ayala-former US Army Human Terrain System contractor-will be sentenced for involuntary manslaughter of an Afghani national.

“U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Contracting Center, has a requirement to provide US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A)with the capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate open source (i.e. sociological or anthropological) information throughout the Afghanistan Theater of Operations(ATO); monitor, track and measure trends in local sentiment regarding USFORA programs and policies; provide professional advice and assistance with regard to cultural, social, religious, political, economic and tribal matters and communication strategies; integrate open source atmospheric information into pre- and post-operational U.S. strategic, operational and tactical decision making; and develop and manage relationships with influential local leaders. The Contractor will share this information with other Government agencies. The Performance Work Statement (PWS) is classified as “secret” and firms will be required to have a facility clearance and access to classified information. The PWS is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Proof of clearances must be submitted and verified before release of the PWS. SIPRnet access is required to view the PWS. A section of the PWS is classified as NOFORN. Distribution to non-US citizens is prohibited, regardless of their clearance or access permissions. Verification of US Citizenship will be required prior to the release of that section.”

BAE Systems (US Army Human Terrain System contractor), Crescent Resources, LLC of New Orleans, CALNET of Reston, Virginia, and Shee Atika Services of Fayetteville, NC have expressed interest in this effort.

HTS Soap Opera Continues

Meanwhile over at the US Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS), troublesome activity is the norm. Asia Times under the heading “Ambush deep in the valley of death“ reports that an unidentified Human Terrain Team member narrowly escaped with his/her life during an ambush in Afghanistan. “Also along for the ride were Pentagon intelligence agents, including an unarmed member of the Human Terrain Team.” One source reports that a sexual assault/rape of a “June Cycle” class member took place but is being kept under close hold by HTS management. [For a related item of interest, see here.]

One source says this:

“I see the drama of HTS is still not subsiding. Rotkoff [deputy program manager] is leaving, going back to Foreign Military Studies Office, so he lost nothing in all this. But there doesn’t seem to be a push, or plan, to open the new office in Oyster Point [Virginia] or to get rid of the non-training folks at Leavenworth. Everyone is in limbo, although some of the military folks are making plans to relocate… LT Jones, featured in Robert Young Pelton’s story [Men's Journal] finished his tour with HTS and is back in Theater again with his Civil Affairs Unit. 1LT Perez, from the Dudley-Flores affair, was ordered back to CONUS but no one from HTS has seen him. He’s either AWOL or the “brass” didn’t want him to report back to Leavenworth, so who knows.”

Who knows if a US national security strategy centered on US COIN will work? In this case, if the the US Army intends to run W52P1J09R008 like it did TRADOC HTS, disaster is guaranteed.

In the end, the key is the American public.

Professors in the Trenches

From the Small Wars Journal's series "Professors in the Trenches: Deployed Soldiers and Social Science Academics":

“the emerging importance of cultural identity and its inherent frictions make it imperative for soldiers and leaders -- military and civilian -- to understand societal and cultural norms of populaces in which they operate and function. They must appreciate, understand, and respect those norms and use them as tools for shaping operations and the effects they expect to achieve.” Such a call for cultural and linguistic agility in the US Armed Forces is not new; it was repeatedly proposed during the Vietnam War but never really fully implemented. Might we even suggest that the lessons of Vietnam were never learned. (sic)

new perceptions about the challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan led the US military to create the ‘Human Terrain System’ emphasizing a greater cultural agility for specially trained teams assisting Brigade commanders with cultural information in decision-making. However, this new intellectual, knowledge-based environment in the US military requires a new, truly cooperative, greatly invigorated partnership with American academe in general and social science/anthropology in particular. Moreover, fundamentally, this new realization, that just maybe brains might be more important than bullets, requires a giant leap in how the US Armed Forces trains their soldiers and prepares Human Terrain Teams for deployment—and uses their experience after deployment. In fighting 4th generation, asymmetric conflicts, cultural agility and foreign language fluency must not be the skill of a selected few soldiers but should become skills valued throughout the US Armed Forces. In the 21st century, differences between military and academic learning has become ever more insignificant and a new, far more cooperative, relationship should be agreed to by both constituencies and rapidly implemented.

Art and Science of PSYOP

Its interesting to see how the increased focus on communications that results from the breakdown of the division between civilian and military in counterinsurgency is fitting so easily into the framework of corporate retail. As political choices are increasingly rendered as "consumer" choices, it's not surprising that the increased role of the military in the political sphere is drawing on the experiences of the business community, particularly the service sector.

From Small War Journal: "Advancing the Art and Science of Psychological Operations Requires a Serious Investment" by Timothy D. Huening:

Another way to achieve greater skills proficiency and/or professional competence is to tailor PSYOP recruiting. There are certain civilian skills that parallel PSYOP unique occupational skills like media entertainment, film and cinematography, broadcast journalism, and media industry experience. A civilian comparison to the skills required for PSYOP would be those desired by Madison Avenue marketing firms or political campaign organizations which expend millions of dollars on research, analysis, and educated individuals to convince the public to buy or vote a certain way.

Ideally, PSYOP research and analysis regarding foreign audiences should be empirical, utilizing a wide range of national intelligence capabilities while leveraging the latest modern and sophisticated, commercial marketing and polling techniques. PSYOP personnel therefore require education and in-depth training in social marketing, public relations, polling, surveying and media production skills.

In today’s ubiquitous media environment where information technology has reached what might be the most primitive and underdeveloped areas of the globe, opportunities for PSYOP are infinite. Information and influence have become commander’s business. Non-kinetic targeting has become the topic of choice among many leaders in operations centers around the globe. Never before could we conceive of a time when information might be the main effort, that day has come.

A media savvy consumer who is accessible and vulnerable is a suitable target of influence. PSYOP is the unit of action. Accordingly, it is essential for our practitioners of influence to be masters of the art and science of influence techniques. This ability must be matched with the capability to integrate these techniques at all levels of warfare, covering military and interagency operations and across the spectrum of conflict.

"Information Operations: A Perspective from the Field"

One LTC Clark waxes philosophic re: "mind war":

Warfare is waged in the air, at sea, on land, in space, and first and foremost, in the mind. Actions in conflict begin in the human brain and are governed by thought; both logical and emotional. People engaged in warfare across all spectra, make decisions based on reason and emotion. Military operations, especially ones battling for ‘human terrain,’ should focus on influencing the emotions, perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of those involved. Warfare is fundamentally is a human social activity. One must recognize that the ultimate judge of the success or failure of military operations is a decision arrived at based on thought. Influencing those thoughts and decisions should weigh heavily into military operations.

The most successful Information Operations to achieve desired effects are by commanders that understand the maximum effective range of an idea is far greater than an M-4 rifle. In order to achieve that effect commanders understand that they need to be proactive with their use of PSYOP, Combat Camera and with their PAO to get messages out to the public domain. Successful commanders understand their audiences because they listen (active listening) and understand the population's needs. They continually assess their environment and adapt to those changes. They understanding that when talking to reporters that you are actually talking to the reporter’s audience, not just the reporter. Commander’s (sic) that operate in the information domain understand that they communicate globally with many audiences; their soldiers, other leaders, and friendly, enemy and neutral populations.

Air Force Ponders Social Media

Interesting post from awhile back by Galhran from Information Dissemination. He's really running with the Christopher Paul/Enlisting Madison Avenue idea about approaching military communications from a business point of view, which suggests that

social marketing is the application of well-grounded commercial marketing techniques to influence noncommercial behavioral change (e.g., quitting smoking and giving blood) in a target audience. Social marketing practices provide a template for U.S. military efforts to motivate specific behaviors in the indigenous population.

I guess the business community is the pedigree of "strategic communications". Highlights from Galhran:

The US Air Force has a slogan that captures the essence of their new media approach: "every Airman is a communicator."
[...]
The point is that "every Airman is a communicator" is as best I can tell not only the slogan, but the business strategy of the Air Force, and because I had no problem playing the role of the critic, my question is whether or not that is a smart communication strategy? I would suggest it could be, but it may also be the perfect example of why the military services, other than the Coast Guard, are struggling to find their voice with new media.

Strategic Communications content that is published consistency in social media (including comments) is considered branding. For example, a disclaimer that gives name or rank would represent a brand. If the services want to build an online brand through social media, they have to know how all their activities work together. There needs to be a consistency and congruency to these activities. Each part of the social media puzzle builds into a picture people have of the brand, how they imagine the brand to be as it relates to how the agency or enterprise really is will be determined based on how well this stuff is done right. Best of all, these activities don't require micromanagement to get right, they can be done effectively if the big ideas are done right and executed properly.

I would use the example of the USNI blog, where the authors do not actually coordinate topics nor does the Naval Institute put out guidance regarding content. We all understand the big idea though, and each have a good idea how to execute it. This allows the individual authors, without coordination, to represent the brand with integrity while producing content that can carry multiple points of view, including opposite points of view in posts.

From an organizational perspective, the complexities extend to how the services brand comes together when multiple individuals are posting topics for discussion. The impact of consistency and congruency on any topic centric strategic communication effort can and will often have a shaping effect. This is an important concept for military organizations today, because as part of our wars, we also find ourselves in an information war.

It's intersting that this is pretty similar to the argument that Herman and Chomsky make in Manufacturing Consent: Propaganda in a democratic society doesn't involve direct censorship or intervention, but a loose coordination of media professionals who all "understand who their boss is", what Galhran here calls "understanding the big idea".

Information warfare through social media is often described as asymmetric warfare. For example, identity is information, a shaping operation for information context, so the identity of a military service blogger in cyberspace is part of a tactical shaping operation for the information being transmitted. By saying you are the US Navy for example, the Navy would be taking a symmetric warfare tactical approach in information shaping operations with their strategic communications. By using an alias when posting a comment, it is essentially taking an assymmetric warfare tactical approach in information shaping operations.

Sock puppets? The answer is sock puppets?

NATO PSYOPS

From PR Watch:

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) turns 60 and some ask why the Cold War alliance still exists, NATO is launching new media and public relations efforts. The NewsMarket, an online source of b-roll and video news release footage, is providing NATO-produced videos to journalists. Not surprisingly, given Barack Obama's controversial plans to increase troops in Afghanistan, the NATO / NewsMarket channel features videos on "mentoring the Afghan Army" and "taking the fight to the Taliban," along with an interview of U.S. National Security Adviser James Jones, a proponent of NATO expansion. "NATO Public Diplomacy Division has developed a comprehensive strategy to engage with young audiences," according to the NATO / NewsMarket press release. NATO's youth outreach includes an "Internet TV" channel and "unconventional advertisement videos" posted to YouTube. NATO spent 500,000 Euros (U.S.$666,000) on the videos, which use the slogan "Peace and security. That's our mission."

Check out these Ads. If these aren't PSYOP, I'm not sure what are. The right side of the clips are cut off, but you can click them and see the whole thing via youtube.